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DEPARTMENT

METIODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN STUDIES OF SENTENCING

The law, especially Anglo-American law, gives as a rule wide latitude
to the determination of the sentence that follows the conviction of a
defendant,, The law may set the minimum or maximum sentence for
the particular crime, it may set the range, or it may allow different
types of sentences (fine, prison, etc.); at the very least, it provides a
choice between two alternatives, for instance, after conviction of a
capital crime, it now allows in most states a finding of death or life
in prison.
As a rule it is the judge who determines the sentence, but in capital
cases, and in some states in other cases, it is the jury.- In one state,
California, it is the prison authority to whom the sentencing decision
falls, the judge merely pronounces sentence in terms of the range set by
the penal code. But wherever the discretionary power lies, discretion
is almost unlimited. Very seldom will an appellate court impinge on
this discretion and change the sentence.3
It is easy to see why the law hesitates to limit individual discretion;
the factors that come into play here are so manifold and possibly so
idiosyncratic that it is difficult to make general rules about sentencing.
However, the great discrepancies that appeared among sentences for
what seemed fairly comparable cases have had two effects. First, the
1. The situation is somewhat different on the European continent, where the penal
code itself enumerates the mitigating and aggravating circumstances the judge must consider. See, however, note 11 infra.
2. In ten states, all in the South, the sentences in all criminal cases are determined
by the jury within the range set by the penal code; in another three states the jury
determines the sentence only for certain specified offenses. See H. KALVEN, H. ZEIsEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY, ch. 20 (1966).
3. See L. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLUM. L. REv.
521, 762 (1937); and Penalty Penology of Appeal: Appellate Review ol Legal But
Excessive Sentences, Note 15 VAND. L. REv. 67 (1962). Again, the situation on the
European continent differs. There the sentence may be, and often is, appealed by either
prosecutor or defendant, even when the finding of guilty is accepted.
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courts became faced with the practical problem of explaining such
discrepancies.'
The other effect of this wide discretionary power in sentencing was
the stimulation of research designed to find out what in fact determined
sentences. This research has been of two kinds: some studies aimed
at finding out the whole range of determining causes, others were designed to test whether one particular cause, such as different regional
standards, or different standards of individual judges made any difference.
Tim

RANcE OF CAusEs

The studies aimed at the general roster of causes have been of two
kinds. Some related, by some sort of correlation analysis, the severity
of a sentence to whatever was known about the case that might conceivably affect the sentence: the type of crime, the record and personality
of the defendant, the personality of the judge, regional differences, and
so forth. Such studies have to cope with the general difficulties of survey
data analysis-retrospective analysis of a great many interrelated variables-and their findings are correspondingly tenuous."
The other approach to learning about the range of causes is to go
and ask the judges who impose the sentence. This method goes under
the technical name of Reason Analysis.' A study from the Office of the
United States Attorney General is such a first attempt. It reports on
the factors judges say tend to produce lenient and severe sentences.7
The exploration of what might be called negative sentencing, namely
the discovery of the reasons for granting executive pardon from the
death sentence, belongs in this group of studies. We have one good
study of this type for the United States and one for the United Kingdom."
4. Celbnates in prison, who view their respective crimes as being of comparable
gravity, often find their sentences differ so widely as to raise serious questions of justice. To avoid such anomalies, the courts have recently begun to develop informal,
internal guidelines for judges of the same jurisdiction, that implement the discretion
within the sentencing range set by the law.
5. Examples of such studies are: G. W. Baab & W. R. Furgeson, Jr., Texas Sentencing Practice: A Statistical Study, 45 TEx. L. REV. 47 (1967); and E. GREEN,
JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING (1961).
6. See H. ZEISEL, SAY IT WITH FIcURES chs. 10 & 11 (5th rev. ed. 1968).
7.

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY

PROCEDURES
8.

OF RELEASE

ch. 11 (1939).

Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L REV. 136 (1964);

COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 1

ROYAL

(1949). See also KALVEN

& ZAsEL, supra note 2, at ch. 36.

. 622 •

HeinOnline -- 3 Law & Soc'y Rev. 622 1968-1969

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN STUDIES OF SENTENCING

To ask judges why they gave a certain sentence in a particular case
is strangely enough an unnatural enterprise. Anglo-American law allows
the judge, when he pronounces sentence, to be completely silent on why
he fixed the sentence on a particular level.9
The most sensible way to begin such an exploration of reasons, is
in a place where these reasons must already exist in articulated form,
for instance, with the California Adult Prison Authority. That agency
is charged with determining the sentences of all convicted prisoners
within the wide frame provided by the law, and, presumably, must
operate with some rules. 10 Another source might be the opinions of the
sentencing review courts of Connecticut and Massachusetts, the only
states that have such an institution."

TESTING FOR ONE FACrOR

One will not be surprised to learn that the more successful approach
to the sentencing problem has been in studies designed to test for the
influence of one or the other single factor, that may or may not affect
the level of sentencing. The simplest example is administrative statistics2
that compare the level of sentencing in different jurisdictions or regions.'
Such crude statistics are meaningful to the extent that the severity of
the crimes committed in these various jurisdictions is comparable. The
best way to approach that problem is, therefore, to determine within
each of these jurisdictions the level of severity of the committed crimes
and base the comparison on whatever differences appear. 3
9. The practice has been severely criticized by Professor Rupert Cross in his inaugural lecture at the University of Oxford, Paradoxes in Prison Sentences, 81 L.Q.
REV. 205 (1965). Here again, the European practice is different: the penal code lists
the circumstances that can alleviate or aggravate the sentence, and the court must say
which ones pertained in the particular case. The Vera Institute of Justice, through what
it calls the Bronx Sentencing Project, has made an interesting effort in this direction.
It has analyzed actual sentences, given by fifty-seven judges of New York City's criminal
court, and related them to the gravity of the offense and other factors that emerged
from the presentencing report in each case. It thereby developed an empirical point
system that served as a basis for sentence recommendation-and prediction.
10. See p. 623 above.
11. Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study,
69 YALE IJ. 1453-78 (1960).
12. For instance: Maximum Sentences by State, National Prisoner Statistics, Prisoners Released from State and Federal Institutions in 1960, Table 55 (1963).
13. A fine example of this approach is R. HOOD, SENTENCING IN MAGISTRATE'S
Coutrs, A STUDY IN VARIATIONS oF PoucY (London, 1962).
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The perfect setting, of course, for such single-factor-studies is provided by the rare situations where there is a random assignment of cases
to the various units under study, usually individual judges within the
same court. Such situations provide the perfect conditions of a controlled experiment.14 Analytical difficulties can not arise, all one has
to do is to compare the sentence pattern of Judge A with the sentence
pattern of Judge B. Any observed differences can be safely assigned to
the different personalities of the two judges.
Thus a study of the New York City Magistrate Court showed that,
among the thirteen judges, one acquitted 73% of the defendants charged
while one of his colleagues acbefore him with public drunkenness,
5
quitted only 1% of his defendants.1

Random assignment of cases to judges also has the advantage of
allowing a more detailed analysis, namely of whether differential sentencing applies also to any subcategory of the assigned cases, e.g. with
respect to public drunkenness, to petty theft, etc. If a group of cases is
assigned randomly, any included subgroup will also be assigned
randomly.
RETROSPECiTVE SuRvEY DATA

Studies of the effect of the judge's personality on sentencing arewith one exception, to be discussed later-the only ones that have the
advantage of random assignment. Studies of other factors that do not
have the advantage of the prospective design of a natural experiment
had to fall back on retrospective survey data.
A fine example of this type of research design is a study undertaken
by the National Defense Fund of the NAACP. That study was designed
to find out whether Southern juries, in deliberating whether to impose
the death sentence on a man convicted of forcible rape, permit the
race of defendant and victim to affect their decision. Specifically, the
14. See H. ZEISEL, supra note 6, at ch. 7.
15. Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. Calm. L. & C. 90 (1919). Later
studies by F. J. Gaudet, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges,
32 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1938) confirmed this idiosyncratic bias of judges.
E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTTUDES IN SENTENCING (1961), based on data from the Criminal
Court in Philadelphia, is the only study that claims to have found no such differences,
but its statistical analysis is open to criticism.
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question was whether a Negro, convicted of having raped a white
woman is, all other circumstances being equal, particularly likely to
receive the death penalty.1" The Arkansas facet of the study established

what is called a first order correlation between race constellation and
frequency of the death penalty. In Arkansas, over a twenty-year period,
Negroes, convicted of having raped a white woman, received the death
penalty significantly more often than the defendants in other race constellations.
Negro Convicted
of Raping a
White Woman

All Other
Convicted
Rapists*

Per cent of cases where defendant
was sentenced to death ................

46%

14%

This category consisted only of Negroes convicted of raping a Negro woman
or white men convicted of raping a white woman. There were no cases of white men
being convicted of raping a Negro woman.

On the basis of this information, the following theorem was appropriately introduced: it is possible that the first order correlation is misleading, since factors related to both the race constellation and the
frequency of the death penalty, which could satisfactorily explain the
original correlation, may exist. Suppose, for instance, more of the
Negro-white rapists had used a weapon in their attack, and for that
reason only showed a higher proportion of death sentences. Such an
interrelationship would reveal the original correlation as spurious, that
is, as not being caused by race prejudice, but by a legitimate factor.
Therefore, the problem was to prove that the original correlation held
not only for all cases combined, but also for every subgroup of comparable gravity, armed as well as unarmed.
The study then suggested a number of factors that could conceivably
explain why the original correlation-while true for all cases as a
16. Forcible rape is still a capital crime in eleven Southern states, and the study
covered those states. The results of the study have been presented for cases in Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana and South Carolina, and this paper focuses on the
Arkansas part of the study. That facet is discussed and evaluated by the District Court
at 257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966) and by the Court of Appeals at 398 F.2d 138
U.S. -, cert. set down for reargument, October, 1969 Term (No. 622) (8th Cir. July
11, 1968) in the case of Maxwell v. Bishop. On December 16, 1968, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in that case, but limited the questions it would consider so as to
exclude considerations of the issues directly related to the study (37 U.S.L.W. 3214).
The study is more briefly described in Matter of Sims and Abrams, 389 F.2d 148
(5th Cir. 1967), involving the Georgia facet, and in Moorer v. South Carolina, 368
F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1966), involving the South Carolina facet.
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whole-could disappear if one compared the race-death penalty relationship for comparable cases of rape.
For each of the factors, the study determined first whether it was
related to the relative frequency of the death penalty. In order to decide
whether or not there was in fact a correlation, the p-values were computed, indicating the probability that the observed differences could
have been obtained by chance. If that value reached the frequently
accepted standard level of p = .05 (5% chance), it was decided that
the two factors were correlated.
P - Value

Correlation
With
Death
Penalty

Factor*
Age of defendant ........................................................................................

.95

Mental status of defendant ........................................................................

.95

Defendant has dependent children ...........................................................

.90

Defendant had record of criminal conviction ........................................

.10

Defendant had prison record .................................................................

.01

A ge of victim ...............................................................................................

.95

Victim has dependent children ..........................................

.70

Contemporaneous other offenses .......................

05

Place of offense (indoor v. outdoor) ..............................................-.......

.95

Illegal entry to place of offense ................................................................

.50

Display of weapon .......................................................................................

.98

Seriousness of injury to victim ...............................................................

.95

Victim was stranger ....

10

............

.......................................- .
Defendant pleaded guilty -..-------------

..

30

.80
Quality of counsel (appointed v. assigned) ............................................
* Other factors were considered such as victim's reputation, but the record
did not contain adequate data.

Only two factors, prior prison record and contemporaneous other
offenses reached the required probability level. These two factors were
then tested to determine whether they were also related to the race
constellation.
• 626.
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Contemporaneous
PrisonRecord
Offenses
Negro
Negro
Ag.
All
Ag.
All
White
Others
White
Others
Percent receiving death penalty
67%
28%
Number of cases ........................
(9)
(7)

73%
(11)

27%
(15)

It turned out in each case that, although the number of defendants became small at this point, the original correlation prevailed.
The analysis was not carried further, because it was thought that
the small number of available cases did not warrant it.
We turn now to another study of this kind, an offshoot of the by
now famous bail experiment of the Vera Institute. Originally, it was
designed to find out whether a relaxation of the bail rules, allowing
a much greater proportion of defendants to be out of jail prior to their
trial, would result in a higher nonappearance rate at the time of trial.
As is well known by now, no such effect appeared, and the recommended
procedure has made history. But this is another story, already told."7
Here we are concerned with a follow-up study, based on the data
from the Vera experiment. Its aim was to find out whether a defendant
who is free on bail at the time of his trial, is, all other circumstances
being equal, treated less severely than the defendant who is still in
jail at the time of his trial. It is one of those all too rare studies in
which a costly set of primary data is put to a secondary use.' 8 Again,
the study begins by establishing the crucial first order correlation:
Defendant Was at
Time of Trial

%Y

Sentenced to prison .................
Lesser sentence or acquitted ..........................................

%

on

in

Bail

Jail

17
83

64
39

100

100

17. See H. ZEISEL, The Law, in THE USES OF SOCIOLOCY (P. Lazarsfeld ed. 1968).

18. A. Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, N.Y.U.L. REV. 941-55 (1965).
Curiously enough, the analyst failed to perceive that an experiment designed to test the
effect of variable a on variable b, is also an experiment testing the effect of a on any

other factor.
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Next, three factors were suggested that could possibly explain the first
order correlation by revealing it as spurious, if they happened to be
related to both the bail-jail situation (the alleged cause) and the prison
-lesser sentence situation (the effect).
Percent Receiving
Prison Sentence

Percent
Detained in Jail
Criminal Record

63
29

yes
no

61
38

Amount of Bail

61
35

$500 or less
over $500

51
26

Quality of Counsel*

70
17

51
23

court assigned
private attorney

*
Two more factors were considered, family integration and employability,
but they were found to be so highly correlated with quality of counsel, that too few
cases would be available in these refined categories. Hence quality of counsel
stands in the analysis for all three variables.

All three factors emerge as potential explicators, since each turned
out to be related to both factors. The analysis then proceeded by
relating each simultaneously to the two factors of the original correlation. Here is the criminal record as an example:
BEING

FREE

ON BAIL AND SEVERITY OF SENTENCE BY CRIIINAL RECORD

No Record

Previous Record

on

in

on

in

bail

jail

bail

jail

Sentenced to prison ................

9

51

36

81

Lesser sentence or acquitted ....

91

49

64

19

100

100

100

100
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Consideration of the criminal record, it turns out, does not only not
destroy the original correlation but strengthens it. The discrepancies
between bail and jail are greater here than in the original correlation
for the cases as a whole. Analogous tabulations of the other two factors
yielded essentially the same results in that the original correlation was
still maintained, although in slightly reduced form.
Not content with these results, the analyst went one step further,
arguing that while none of these factors alone was able to destroy
the original correlation, perhaps jointly they could. (This step was
missing in the rape study discussed earlier.) The following table was
then constructed:
SEVERITY OF SENTENCE WHEN

BEING FREE ON-TBAIL AND

FAVORABLE CAA

NUMBER OF

cTursxsics Is HELD CONSTANT
Number of Favorable Characteristics'

None

Percent Sentenced to
Prison in Each
Group ....................

One

Two

on
bail

in
jail

on
bail

in
jail

on
bail

in
jail

72

82

26

73

17

52

(107)

(68)

(18)
Number of Cases ......

(110) (122) (62)

Three
on
in
bail jail

6
(67)

(2)

A favorable characteristic is one that favors the defendant. E.g., no criminal
record, etc.
** Too few cases.

The table shows that on each of the four levels-each more favorable

to the defendant than the preceding one-the defendants in jail are
treated more harshly. 19 In principle this type of table reconstructs the
experimental design. Actually it suffers typically from attrition of cases
in the marginal categories, while cases in the center groups bulge.
Secondly, this type of arrangement assumes that each factor has
about the same effect, and that these effects are additive. The above
19. I should like to add a digression here. Miss Rankin's study shows that being in
jail at the time of trial not only increases the sentence in case of conviction, but also
increases the chances of being convicted. I have seldom seen a more disconcerting result
of an empirical legal study; yet it caused not so much as a ripple in the law world.
This is a melancholy comment on the powers of social research to change the real world.
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table is, in fact, a contraction of the eight categories formed by the
full combination of all three factors to four. We see now why the two
Complete Cross-Tabulation of
"Favorable Characteristics"
Criminal

$500 Bail
or More

Less Than
8500

8500 Bail
or More
Assigned

Private

Assigned

None

One

One

ConCounseI

No Record

Record

Counsel

Private

ICounsel

Two

Assigned

lCounsel

One

Less Than
8500

Private Assigned [iate
J[oueel
Counsel Counsel
J

Two

Two

Three

Two

One

center categories ("one" and "two" favorable characteristics) bulge;
each one represents in fact three categories.
Nevertheless, it is always advisable to see the complete crosstabulation even if some of its cells turn out to be empty. First of all,
techniques have now been developed for analyzing some of these
incomplete tables;2 secondly, it is only from such a table that one
can decide on the proper eventual compromise solution.2 1
20. See, for instance, L Goodman, The Analysis of Cross.Classified Data: Independence, Quasi-Independence, and Interactions in Contingency Tables With or Without
Missing Entries. J. AM. STATIST. Ass'N, Dec. 1968.
21.

Finally, I should like to report here still another, hybrid approach to the prob-

lem. It was developed by Rupert Cross (supra note 9), and rests on asking judges
what sentence they would give in cases submitted to them in a thumbnail sketch containing all the relevant features of the case. However, the point of the experiment,
unknown to the judges, was the occasional addition of a potentially prejudicial circumstance, clearly irrelevant to the severity of the crime. Thus, one group of the
judges would receive a case of negligent automobile homicide, while another group of
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DEATH SENTENCE n

MURDER CASES

In the states that have retained the death penalty, it is, as a rule,
the duty of the jury to decide whether the defendant is to receive it.
And since the law here insists on giving the jury no guidance as to
when it is to impose the death sentence, the quest for the jury's
reasons is particularly difficult. Two major attempts have been made
to explore this area. One proceeded by way of "reason analysis," as
23
part of the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School.
The other, more recently, by way of discriminant (multiple regression)
analysis, of 238 first-degree murder cases in which California juries
actually made the decision, gave the death sentence in 103 cases, and
withheld it in 135.24 Here the attempt was made to determine the
extent to which any or all of 178 factors, for which data were made
available on these 238 cases, moved the jury to give or withhold the
death penalty. These factors, some attributes, some variables, covered
five major areas: the defendant, the victim, the circumstances of the
crime, characteristics of the trial, and the main actors in the trial-the
judge, the prosecutor, and the defense lawyers. But the critical review
of this important and complex enterprise must await another day.
-HANS

ZEISEL

judges would receive the very same case with one innocent addition, such as that the
guilty driver "a married man, had his mistress in the automobile." It is my understanding that the adulterers were "punished" more severely.
22. See note 6, supra.
23. See Kalvan and Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY, 1966, A Somber Postscript:
Decisions on the Death Penalty.
24. A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN.
FORD LAW R. 1297 (1969).
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